Health Care Cost Drivers and Options for Control by Glickman, Aaron & Weiner, Janet
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Issue Briefs Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics 
4-28-2020 
Health Care Cost Drivers and Options for Control 
Aaron Glickman 
Janet Weiner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/ldi_issuebriefs 
 Part of the Health Economics Commons, and the Health Policy Commons 
Glickman, Aaron and Weiner, Janet. Health Care Cost Drivers and Options for Control. LDI Issue Briefs. 
2020; 23 (4). https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/health-care-cost-drivers-and-options-control 
" > 
https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/health-care-cost-drivers-and-options-control 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/ldi_issuebriefs/143 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Health Care Cost Drivers and Options for Control 
Abstract 
The growth of health care costs remains a serious concern in the United States. Slowing this growth 
involves understanding what drives health care costs and how to target those drivers effectively. In this 
brief, we review the relative importance of different health care cost drivers, including insurance benefits 
design, price inflation, provider incentives, technological growth, and inefficient system performance. We 
analyze the impact of these factors on the growth of health care spending in the last decade, which has 
been concentrated in hospitals and felt most acutely in the private market. We find that unit prices and 
technology remain the most important cost drivers of this recent growth. In reviewing public and private 
payer initiatives that target health care costs, we find that some have yielded modest results, but the 
evidence on most strategies is inconclusive or mixed. Designing and implementing effective interventions 
to slow cost growth remains a challenge, particularly in the privately insured market, where premiums 
have risen considerably in the last decade. 
Keywords 
"health care, costs, health cost, health economics" 
Disciplines 
Health Economics | Health Policy 
License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
This brief is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/ldi_issuebriefs/143 
April 2020 | Vol. 23, No. 4
BRIEFIssue
HEALTH CARE 
COST DRIVERS 
AND OPTIONS 
FOR COST 
CONTROL 
Aaron Glickman, MPA 
Janet Weiner, PhD, MPH
Colonial Penn Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
ldi.upenn.edu
P: 215-898-5611
F: 215-898-0229
 @PennLDI
The growth of health care costs 
remains a serious concern in the United 
States. Slowing this growth involves 
understanding what drives health care 
costs and how to target those drivers 
effectively. In this brief, we review the 
relative importance of different health 
care cost drivers, including insurance 
benefits design, price inflation, provider 
incentives, technological growth, and 
inefficient system performance.  We 
analyze the impact of these factors on 
the growth of health care spending in the 
last decade, which has been concentrated 
in hospitals and felt most acutely in 
the private market. We find that unit 
prices and technology remain the most 
important cost drivers of this recent 
growth. In reviewing public and private 
payer initiatives that target health care 
costs, we find that some have yielded 
modest results, but the evidence on 
most strategies is inconclusive or mixed. 
Designing and implementing effective 
interventions to slow cost growth remains 
a challenge, particularly in the privately 
insured market, where premiums have 
risen considerably in the last decade.
INTRODUCTION 
Health care costs in the United States, and their rate of 
growth, remain a serious concern for payers and policymakers. 
Sustainable levels of spending depend on slowing the rate 
of growth. And slowing the rate of growth requires effective 
policies that target drivers most amenable to change. 
In this brief, we summarize the literature on the drivers of health 
care cost increases. We consider the relative importance of 
insurance design, unit prices, provider incentives and delivery 
system performance, and technological growth. We review 
the evidence to date on how public and private payers can 
affect these drivers to slow the rate of cost growth.  
We then ground this evidence in the national context of how 
the financing of health care has shifted over the last decade, 
including a greater role for public payers and the increasing share 
of spending devoted to hospitals. The data come mainly from 
the federal National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), 
which provides a detailed picture of health care costs, and an 
overview of the flow of money through the health system.
WHAT DRIVES HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING GROWTH? 
At a basic level, increases in health care spending occur because of 
some combination of changes in prices, utilization, and the severity 
of patient case mix (e.g., demographic changes). Within these broad 
conceptual categories, specific drivers play different roles in increasing 
health care spending, depending on the period studied and the 
framework used. 
For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) identified 
eight historical drivers of rising health care costs from 1940-1990, 
and estimated their relative contribution (Table 1).1 All growth that 
could not be attributed to the observable factors were attributed to 
technology. Not surprisingly, the report concluded that “the most 
important factor driving the long-term growth of health care costs 
has been the emergence, adoption, and widespread diffusion of new 
medical technologies and services by the U.S. health care system.” 
The importance of technology was underscored in a 2017 study 
that used a different framework to quantify drivers of cost growth 
nationally between 1996 and 2013. The study counted technology 
as a subcategory of service price and intensity and found that more 
than 50% of all spending growth could be attributed to that category 
(Figure 1). Changes in utilization and disease prevalence were not 
significant factors.2  
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Table 1. Estimated contributions of specific factors to health care cost 
growth (CBO), 1940-1990
DRIVER
ESTIMATED 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
SPENDING GROWTH
Aging of the population 2%
Changes in third-party payment 10-13%
Personal income growth* 5-23%
Unit prices 11-22%
Administrative costs 3-13%
Defensive medicine and  
supplier-induced demand** 
0%
Technology-related changes 38-65%
*  Health care is a “normal” economic good, so as income grows people spend more 
on health care. At the national level, there is a linear correlation between per capita 
GDP and percent of GDP spent on health care.
**  Defensive medicine refers to services with little or no clinical value that clinicians 
order to avoid lawsuits. Supplier-induced demand refers to physicians increasing 
service volume to offset lost revenue from fee reductions. 
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Figure 1. Factors associated with health care expenditure growth
Source: Dieleman, J. L., Squires, E., Bui, A. et al. (2017). JAMA.  
doi:10.1001/jama.2017.15927
To estimate the drivers of more recent health care spending, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the 
Actuary used a model that considers the contribution of price growth, 
changes in the age and sex composition of the population, and 
residual use and intensity (i.e., utilization not attributable to the other 
two factors). According to CMS, demographic factors remain steady 
from year to year, but the contribution of price growth and residual 
use/intensity of services varies by year (Figure 2). For example, in 2015 
residual use drove most of the 5.0% increase in per capita spending, in 
the wake of Affordable Care Act (ACA) coverage gains. In contrast, 
in 2018 about over half of the 4.0% increase in per capita spending 
was due to price growth.3 
Which of these factors are sensitive to policy changes by public and 
private payers, and which policies have been successful in curbing cost 
growth? In the following review, we disaggregate specific drivers and 
discuss the effectiveness of different approaches that target them.
DRIVERS: 
Consumer demand  
People who are insulated from the full cost of their care tend to 
use more health care services than they otherwise would. From the 
RAND health insurance experiment in the 1960s to the more recent 
Oregon Health Insurance experiment, many studies demonstrate 
that generous coverage of health care services produces greater use 
(including some overuse) of health care services by consumers.4,5 
Strategies to control consumer-driven overutilization 
Increasingly, private insurers have turned to higher deductibles (Figure 
3) as a way to counteract excessive utilization that generous insurance 
might induce. Deductibles and co-payments are highly effective 
at reducing utilization. A recent study found that when employers 
switched to high-deductible health plans, overall health care spending 
declined 11.7%-13.8%, and consumers reduce their spending by 42% 
when under a deductible. However, the study found that consumers 
cut high value and low value care in equal proportion, indicating 
that increased cost sharing is an effective but blunt instrument for 
controlling the growth of health care costs.6 
Additionally, employers can shift to managed care plans, such as 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) arrangements, in which 
patients must go through a primary care “gatekeeper” to gain access 
to costly specialist services. In the 1980s, managed care plans rose in 
popularity in the private market, and in 1993 over 70% of Americans 
with health insurance were in a managed plan.7 The managed care 
backlash in the late 1990s is associated with a rapid rise in health care 
spending.8 
Does managed care limit cost growth? Several factors complicate 
assessing the effectiveness of managed care. First, managed care 
describes a heterogeneous set of plan types. Second, managed care 
plans tend to attract healthier populations, so they benefit from a 
selection bias. Despite the healthier population, literature reviews 
of managed care in the private market and within Medicare (i.e., 
3
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Figure 3. Rates of deductibles in the employer-based market, 2006  
and 2017 (AHRQ) 
Source: Hartman, M., Martin, A. B., Benson, J., et al. (2019). Health Affairs.  
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01451
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Figure 2. Factors associated with health care cost growth (CMS) 
Medicare Advantage) suggest that charges in HMO plans are 10-15% 
lower than non-HMO plans, and a greater penetration of gatekeeper-
based plans can slow spending growth overall.7,9
Most states have shifted their Medicaid beneficiaries to private, 
capitated managed care plans over the last decade. From 2007 to 
2016, the share of Medicaid enrollees in managed care rose from 64% 
to 81%.10 A 2012 analysis from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
found that savings from transitioning Medicaid beneficiaries to 
managed care plans are modest at best, with a wide variation.11 
DRIVERS: 
Over-utilization (provider focused) and delivery 
system performance (inefficiency)
Under-performing and fragmented health care delivery systems may 
also drive up costs. Under fee-for-service conditions, providers—
including physicians and hospitals—have incentives to overuse 
medical services and lack financial motivation to deliver coordinated, 
operationally efficient care. Health care waste includes the use of 
unnecessary services—the use of services beyond evidence-based 
benchmarks—as well as inefficiently delivered services that result from 
fragmentated or poorly coordinated systems. A 2019 literature review 
found that unnecessary utilization, reliance on low-value services, 
and excess cost due to uncoordinated or inefficiently delivered care 
account for between $205 and $344 billion in annual excess spending. 
Once adding in pricing failures, fraud, and administrative complexity, 
the study found that a quarter of all health care spending ($760 to 
$935 billion) could be classified as wasteful.12  
There are several hypotheses for why providers may recommend 
unnecessary or inefficient services, based on providers trying to 
maintain a level of income or having a tendency to recommend 
services with mixed evidence.13 Although the reasons are complex, it 
is clear that providers can and do induce unecessary utilization and 
often fail to deliver well-coordinated care, both of which drive up 
costs. 
As early as 1978, economists observed that all else equal, increases in 
surgeons per capita increased use of surgical services.14 More recently, 
studies of geographic variation in health care spending among 
Medicare beneficiaries demonstrated wide variation in spending that 
is unexplained by health status, geography, or prices.15 A National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on 
geographic spending also concluded that provider decision making 
was the primary cause of excessive spending, without any relationship 
to quality or access to services.16 
Strategies to control provider-induced demand and improve 
delivery system performance
To change the incentives inherent in fee-for-service payment, the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized market-based reforms to 
shift financial risk for total cost of care to providers, with payments tied 
to improved quality or reduced net cost. So far, payment reforms such 
as bundled payments and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 
have yielded very modest spending reductions for certain procedures 
and types of patients.
Bundled payments put providers at financial risk for the total cost 
of care for an episode of care, such as hip or knee replacements. 
Providers are penalized for going over a benchmark price, and share 
in the savings for coming under the target. Bundled payments have 
modestly reduced per-episode costs for many surgical procedures. 
Evaluations of voluntary and mandatory programs for hip and knee 
replacements have found per-episode savings between 1.6% and 
3.9%.17-19 However, for medical conditions such as heart attacks or 
pneumonia, evaluations have shown no per-episode or overall savings 
for Medicare to date. 
Fewer studies have assessed the impact of bundled payments in 
commercial insurance. However, a recent study of a multi-payer 
program in Arkansas found that mandatory bundled payment 
arrangements for perinatal care yielded a 3.8% relative decrease in 
per-episode costs.20 
While bundled payments target specific episodes of care, ACOs 
are networks of physicians, hospitals, and other providers that are 
responsible for the total cost of care for a specified population, i.e., 
population health. The largest program, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) has more than 500 participating ACOs that cover 
over 11 million lives.21 ACOs earn shared savings if they come in under 
a benchmark annual growth rate of roughly 2%. In 2010, the CBO 
estimated that ACOs would save a net of $1.7 billion for the federal 
government between 2013 and 2016, but a recent analysis suggests 
that after making shared savings payments and considering program 
cost, the MSSP ACOs have a net cost of $384 million in that time.22 
Other analysts argue that ACO performance builds over time, and 
generated savings of over $300 million in 2017.23 Regardless of the 
debate on estimated impact, it is clear that any benefit for cost growth 
is small in magnitude. 
Within commercial insurance, the effectiveness of ACO contracts 
has not been well-studied. However, the Massachusetts Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC) yields some insight. The Massachusetts 
AQC is a population-based payment model in Blue Cross Blue 
Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts, that includes both financial risks 
and rewards for providers. A recent evaluation found that over 
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eight years, the AQC resulted in 11.7% relative savings on enrollee 
claims, with no change in quality.24 Furthermore, in Hawaii, the Hawaii 
Medical Service Association (HMSA) recently introduced the 
Population-based Payments for Primary Care (3PC) program. 3PC 
is a population-based payment system that replaces fee-for-service 
primary care payments with risk-adjusted per-member per-month 
(PMPM) fees and offers primary care providers shared savings based 
on risk-adjusted member spending. A recent 1-year evaluation found 
that 3PC was successful in improving quality and changing practice 
patterns (e.g., intended modest reductions in primary care visits), 
which may be harbingers of future savings, though there were no 
differences in total cost of care in the year 1 evaluation.25
Vermont is experimenting with an all-payer ACO model that began 
in 2017. Although enrollment is voluntary, the state has stated its 
goals of having 70% of all insured residents and 90% of its Medicare 
beneficiaries in ACOs by 2022. Per capita spending growth in the 
ACO is limited to 3.5%, with Medicare spending growth limited to 0.1-
0.2% below national Medicare growth.26 Robust data from Vermont’s 
all-payer ACO model will not be available for several years, as the 
performance period ends at the end of 2022. 
DRIVERS: 
Technology 
New medical interventions, surgeries, imaging services, drugs, and 
diagnostic tools expand the scope of health care and often command 
a higher unit price. When health care services improve or extend 
life, they may be of social value, even when they increase spending.27 
When new technologies can alleviate health conditions, one-time 
increases in spending may yield lower long-term spending.28 
However, policymakers and the public are questioning the cost-
effectiveness of many new technologies, both in terms of the prices 
commanded and the outcomes achieved. For example, the extent to 
which new oncology drugs offer meaningful improvements in overall 
survival and quality of life is hotly debated,29 as evidence mounts that 
patients are paying more per year of life gained than ever before.30 
Strategies to control technology-related spending growth
Public and private payers have little sway over which drugs and 
technologies are brought to market, but they do have specific tools 
to limit improper use of new technologies First, payers can refuse 
to cover new tests, drugs, and treatments. Many countries with 
single-payer style health care systems utilize Health Technology 
Assessments (HTAs) to weigh the value of new treatments and 
inform decisions about whether or not to cover them. For example, 
the Australian Medicare Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) 
and UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
consider clinical and cost effectiveness when issuing guidance 
regarding which services should be included in Australian Medicare or 
the British National Health Service. 
The US lacks centralized HTAs.31 Instead, individual insurers and 
public payers make coverage decisions on an ad hoc basis.32-34 The 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI), established 
under the ACA, funds comparative effectiveness studies, but does 
not make coverage decisions.35 To date, while there are anecdotes 
of insurers or pharmacy benefit managers restricting access to new 
treatments, the effects of these decisions on cost growth is unknown.36 
Given the tendency to cover new treatments, one common strategy 
to control utilization is prior authorization (PA), in which a provider 
must request approval from a health plan before delivering a service. 
PA requirements have become increasingly commonplace in the 
case of very costly new drugs. For example, a 2018 study found 
that more than 80% of patients across all insurance sectors had a 
PA requirement for PCSK9 inhibitors, a new treatment for patients 
with familial hypercholesterolemia or atherosclerotic cardiovascular 
disease.37
PA requirements raise concerns over patient access and physician 
autonomy, but evidence suggests they may reduce utilization of 
some low-value services. From 2012 through 2017, CMS initiated 
four PA demonstration projects and one permanent PA program. 
The demonstrations were targeted to services deemed to be at high 
risk for improper use, such as including mobility devices (e.g., power 
wheelchairs), and non-emergency hyperbaric oxygen therapy. A 
GAO analysis of these programs found these projects significantly 
reduced Medicare expenditures and, if expanded, would yield 
between $1.1 and $1.9 billion in annual savings.38 Within the private 
commercial space, a recent study found that prior authorization 
of costly drugs or drugs with high abuse potential can reduce the 
targeted use of the targeted drug by half.39 However, American 
Medical Association surveys show that the vast majority of physicians 
believe that prior authorization has negative effects on patient clinical 
outcomes and imposes significant, unreimbursed costs on practices.40 
Reducing the administrative burden and cost of PA programs should 
be a primary concern. 
Recently, commercial insurers have begun to experiment with two 
methods to manage the use of drugs: formulary tiering and reference 
pricing. Formulary tiering involves the categorization of drugs as 
“preferred” or “non-preferred,” based on evidence of efficacy, cost, or 
a combination of the two. The structure of formulary tiering programs 
can vary, but in general they reduce or eliminate co-pays for preferred 
medications and, in some cases, increase co-pays for non-preferred 
drugs. In theory, tiered formularies direct patients to lower-cost, 
clinically equivalent therapies. 
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The literature regarding formulary tiering is varied, and most studies 
use medication adherence as the primary outcome of interest.41,42 
One large study of a value-based formulary in the pacific northwest 
suggests that tiering can reduce both drug-related and overall 
expenditures. In 2010, Premera Blue Cross implemented a formulary 
benefit design for employees that used cost-effectiveness analysis 
to determine copayments. An evaluation of the program found that 
medication expenditures fell 10% compared to a control group, with 
no effects on overall utilization or non-medication expenditures.43 
Other evaluations of tiered formularies show more mixed results. 
A 2014 study of a value-based insurance design (VBID) in Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina found that reducing co-pays 
for branded medications and eliminating all cost-sharing for generics 
resulted in improved medication adherence and reductions in 
nonmedication expenditures, but those savings were swamped by 
increases in medication expenditures.44 The evidence suggests that 
value-based formularies, when structured correctly and paired with 
disease management programs, may improve medication adherence, 
but only have marginal impacts on cost.45 
In contrast, reference pricing classifies individual drugs based on 
therapeutic class, and payment rates are pegged to the price of one 
of the cheapest (or average of) drugs in that class—with consumers 
making up the difference. While reference pricing is commonly 
employed abroad, it has only recently gained attention in the US. 
To date, the evidence of how effective reference pricing is remains 
weak. One study of a reference pricing initiative in a large self-insured 
plan found that limiting payment to the price of the least-costly drug 
in each therapeutic category (unless a physician exemption was 
made) resulted in a 7% higher share of prescriptions being filled with 
the lowest-cost drug relative to a control group, and the average 
price paid per prescription declined 13.9%, generating savings of 
$1.34 million for the employer over 18 months. Importantly, patient 
copayments did increase as well, by $0.12 million (30.9% on average).46 
DRIVERS: 
Unit prices 
Across all health care services, the US has higher unit prices than 
comparable countries. Further, within the US, the private sector pays 
far higher prices than the public sector, a differential that has increased 
substantially in the past 15 years.47 A recent literature review found that, 
on average, employer-based plans pay hospitals double the Medicare 
rate for inpatient services and triple the rate for outpatient services.48 
Hospital consolidation is driving price growth. A 2017 study found 
that from 2010 to 2016 hospital markets became increasingly 
consolidated, with over 90% of metropolitan statistical areas having 
highly concentrated hospital markets, compared to 65% for specialist 
physicians.49 There is strong evidence that mergers increase prices 
for services,50 and a recent analysis of private health insurance claims 
found that inpatient hospital prices grew 42% from 2007 to 2014, while 
physician prices for inpatient care grew 18%.51 
In addition to horizontal integration through mergers, hospitals have 
also accelerated their purchasing of physician practices—with the 
proportion of physician practices owned by hospitals doubling from 
2002 through 2008 and continuing over the last decade, partially 
in response to the expansion of value-based payment policies.52,53 
Although vertical integration of physician practices and hospitals 
offers the promise of greater efficiencies in the delivery of value-
based care, evidence suggests that it has led to price increases,54 
rather than quality improvements.55 Most recently, a 2018 study found 
that from 2007 to 2013, prices for services provided by acquired 
physicians rose by an average of 14.1% after acquisition, and most of 
the pricing increase was attributable to the increased use of pricing 
rules that favor hospitals.53 
Strategies to control unit prices 
Facing consolidated markets in which a single hospital system may be 
the only provider available, commercial insurers have less leverage to 
negotiate lower unit prices. Without state interventions, commercial 
insurers generally control price inflation by increasing leverage in 
negotiations with providers. Historically, these strategies have included 
HMOs, tiered networks, and, increasingly, narrow networks, in which 
providers accept lower reimbursements in exchange for being 
included in a plan’s limited network. Recent work suggests that narrow 
network plans on the health insurance marketplaces have 16% cheaper 
premiums, suggesting a pricing discount.56 
Commercial insurers have also experimented with reference pricing 
for specific services, in which payers set a maximum payment rate for 
a service. These initiatives tend to focus on narrow bands of services, 
such as outpatient procedures (e.g., joint replacements) or tests (e.g., 
lab services) with the intention of changing consumer choices in 
the short term and, in the long term, encouraging price competition 
by suppliers. To date, most publicly available data of the effects 
of reference pricing come from the California Public Employees 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and Safeway, which instituted 
reference pricing systems for many outpatient procedures, diagnostic 
tests, and laboratory services. A recent literature review found that 
rates of patients selecting below-reference price services increased 
from 8.6% to 18.6% depending on the service, and the average price 
reduction for most services clustered between 17% and 21%.57 
In a few states, lawmakers have acted to target unit prices with all-payer 
rate setting and reference pricing initiatives that limit legally allowed 
provider charges. Maryland has controlled hospital prices with all-payer 
rate setting since the 1970s. In 2014, CMS and Maryland transitioned 
6
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all hospitals to global budgets with specific benchmarks to keep overall 
health care spending at or below state GDP growth. By the end of 
2016, the new model had generated $586 million in Medicare savings 
from reduced hospital spending growth, exceeding the 2018 target 
of $330 million. Maryland has achieved an annual hospital spending 
growth of 1.53% per capita, beating the 3.58% target rate. In 2018, the 
state received approval to expand its global budgets beyond hospitals 
to include some outpatient care.58 Similarly, Montana and California 
have instituted reference price systems that limit the prices of certain 
hospital services to a specific multiple of Medicare rates.59,60 The 
evidence of these statewide reference pricing initiatives is unavailable. 
In 2010, Rhode Island’s Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner 
implemented a set of “affordability standards” in an effort to control 
growth in the commercial insurance market. The standards included 
price controls that capped annual increases for inpatient and 
outpatient charges at medical inflation plus 1%. A recent analysis of 
commercial claims in Rhode Island from 2007-2016 suggests that per-
enrollee spending growth was 4.8% lower in commercial fee-for-service 
contracts, and 2.7% lower overall, than similar adults in other states.61 
DRIVERS IN CONTEXT: 
How much does the United States spend, and how 
fast is spending increasing? 
The growth of national health care spending has slowed over the past 
decade, compared to the 2001-2007 period (Figure 4). Per capita 
spending increased from $7,890 in 2008 to $11,172 in 2018. Health care 
spending as a share of GDP grew moderately between 2008 and 
2016 (from 16.3% to 17.9%) but has generally stabilized (Figures 4 and 
5). These overall numbers, as well as the analysis to follow, are drawn 
from the CMS National Health Expenditure Accounts.
These aggregate data tell us little about the value of health care 
spending, in terms of outcomes and alternative uses for these 
funds. On the one hand, health care spending can grow because of 
expanding access to care, or because new, effective treatments come 
to market. On the other hand, spending can grow because prices for 
the same services increase without delivering better outcomes. 
SHIFTING PAYER LANDSCAPE 
Public payers have taken on a larger role in financing health care over 
the last decade. Private sources accounted for 55.2% of all spending in 
2018, down from 58.7% in 2008. At the same time, the share of public 
spending increased from 41.3% to 44.8%.
Pubic spending is growing in its share of total spend due to population 
aging into Medicare and the expansion of Medicaid. From 2008 to 
2018, Medicare enrollment grew by 32.2% and Medicaid enrollment 
grew by 54.2%. In contrast to Medicare and Medicaid, overall private 
health care spending has risen substantially despite enrollment 
increasing by only 1.8%, with a net decline in employer-sponsored 
insurance enrollment from 177.3 million to 175.2 million (Figure 6).
Public payers tend to cover individuals with greater health care needs, 
such as the elderly and disabled, so per-enrollee spending was much 
higher in Medicare ($12,784) and Medicaid ($8,201) than in employer-
sponsored insurance ($6,103) in 2018. However, since 2008, total 
per enrollee spending growth was highest in employer-sponsored 
insurance (46.4%), followed by Medicare (21.5%), and Medicaid 
(12.5%). Therefore, while public spending has increased as a share of 
national health care expenditures as a result of rising enrollment, the 
private market is experiencing greater per-enrollee cost growth.
7
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Figure 4. Average overall and per capita health care expenditure growth, 
2001-2008 versus 2008-2018
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Figure 5. Increases in per capita health spending and health care as share 
of GDP, 2008-2018 
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Cost growth in the private market is reflected in substantial 
premium increases. The Kaiser Family Foundation’s Employer 
Health Benefits Survey indicates that from 2008-2018, the 
average family premium for employer-sponsored insurance 
increased from $12,680 to $19,616, and premiums for individual 
coverage increased from $4,704 to $6,896 (46.6%). 62 
WHERE DOES HEALTH CARE  
SPENDING GO? 
Nationally, most health care spending occurs in three 
categories. In 2018, spending on hospitals, professional 
services, and prescription drugs accounted for 32.7%, 26.4%, 
and 9.2% of national health expenditures, respectively 
(Figure 7). The next highest category—the net cost of health 
insurance administration and profit—accounted for 7.1% of 
total spending. All other categories—residential care, nursing 
home care, research, and public health activities—are small 
fractions of national health care spending. 
NATIONAL SPENDING GROWTH  
BY MAJOR CATEGORY  
From 2008 to 2018, hospitals have grown as the major center 
of health care costs. On a per capita basis, hospital spending 
increased from $2,389 to $3,649 (52.7%), or an average of 
4.3% per year—well above average overall spending growth 
(Figure 8). In contrast, on a per capita basis, professional 
services grew at an average rate of 3.4% from $2,137 to 
$2,955—just below average overall expenditures. Similarly, 
drugs and medical goods grew at an average rate of 2.6%, 
from $1,076 to $1,397 (29.8% overall). 
8
BRIEFIssueLDI
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Hospital Care Professional Services Outpatient prescription drugs
■ 2008       ■ 2018     
30.3%
32.7%
27.1% 26.4%
10.0% 9.2%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Hospital care Physician and
clinical services
Prescription drugs and
medical products
Sh
ar
e o
f t
ot
al 
sp
en
di
ng
 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Overall
Health
Expenses
Hospital Physician
and
Clinical
Services
Dental
Services
Other
Professional
Services
Other
Health,
Residential,
and Personal 
Care 
Home
Health
Care
Nursing
Care
Facilities
and Continuing
Care Retirement
Communities
Prescription
Drugs
33.1%
38.7%
28.0%
25.1%
14.2%
10.8%
4.3%
6.0%
3.3%
2.4%
3.8%
6.0%
7.9%
6.3%
2.2%
Figure 7. Share of national health expenditures of three major categories,  
2008 and 2018
Hospital Care Accounts for an Increasing  
Share of National Health Expenditures
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Overall
Health
Expenses
Hospital Physician
and
Clinical
Services
Dental
Services
Other
Professional
Services
Other Health,
Residential, and
Personal Care 
Home
Health
Care
Nursing Care
Facilities and Continuing
Care Retirement
Communities
Prescription
Drugs
4.3%
6.0% 6.0%
3.3%
2.4%
6.3%6.0%
2.2%
7.9%
3.8%
Figure 8. Average annual change in per capita spending, by category, for commercial insurers, 2008-2018 
Growth of Hospital Spending from 2008 to 2018 Particularly Steep for Commercial Insurers
7.3%
4.3%
6.3%
3.5%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
2001-2008 2008-2018
■ Overall       ■ Per Capitia       
15%
16%
17%
18%
19%
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000
$11,000
$12,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Per Capita Spending ($) Health Care as Share of GDP (%)
2.8%
4.4%
0.1% -0.2%
2.3%
1.3%
4.3%
4.0%
5.1%
5.7%
4.4%
3.8%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
Medicare Medicaid All Private Health Insurance Employer-sponsored insurance
■ Enrollment       ■ Per Capitia spending       ■ Total spending      
Figure 6. Average annual enrollment, per capita spending, and total expenditure 
growth by payer, 2 08-2 18 
Spending Growth: Driven by Enrollment in Public Insurance,  
Per-Enrollee Costs in Private Insurance
The growth of hospital spending has been particularly acute for private insurers. From 
2008 to 2018, per capita private health insurance spending in hospitals grew by 78.4%, an 
average rate of 6.0% per year (from $1,345 to $2,340). As a result, hospital spending grew 
its share of total private health insurance spending, from 33.1% to 38.7%. 
In contrast, per capita spending on physician and clinical services increased by an 
average rate of 3.3% per year, (36.5% total), from $1,139 to $1,555. Similarly, on a per 
capita basis, spending on prescription drugs grew by 2.2% per year, from $546 to $670 
per person. As a result, both professional services and prescription drugs fell as a share 
of private health insurance expenditures. 
While other classes of spending are small components of commercial health spending, it 
is important to note that several smaller categories have experienced rapid growth over 
the last decade. In particular, per capita private health insurance spending on nursing 
care/retirement facilities and home health care grew at average annual rates of 6.3% and 
7.9%, respectively, although they remain a very low share of total private spending (less 
than 2%).
CONCLUSION  
This review of the drivers of health care costs—and the strategies put in place to slow 
them—demonstrates the relative contribution of unit prices, utilization, and technology 
on rising health care spending. While the overall growth of health care costs has slowed 
in recent years, much of the success has been attributable to Medicare and Medicaid 
initiatives to control price. Commercial insurers, without the leverage of the state 
or federal government, still face the challenge of unrelenting growth in per-enrollee 
spending, particularly in the hospital sector. 
Historically, commercial insurers have sought to control health care costs with initiatives 
directed at consumers. These include increasing deductibles and designing benefits to 
induce cost-conscious shopping behavior among consumers. While there is evidence 
that some of these consumer-directed initiatives reduce expenditures, they are blunt 
instruments that tend to cut low- and high-value care in equal proportion. 
More importantly, focusing on consumer behavior may begin to yield diminishing 
returns. Over the last decade, when it comes to spending in the private sector, sustained 
price hikes and provider practice patterns appear to be the most important drivers 
of health care spending. In particular, as hospitals continue to consolidate through 
horizontal integration and the purchase of ancillary outpatient clinics, prices paid for 
both inpatient and outpatient hospital services have grown substantially faster than for 
physician services. 
So far, efforts that focus on supplier-based overprovision of services, such as 
Accountable Care Organizations and bundled payments, have yielded modest savings. 
Some states and regulators have had more success with global budgeting and rate 
setting for hospital services. For commercial insurers specifically, however, no single 
strategy emerges as the best way to change provider behavior or control price growth. 
Rather, cost control in the private sector relies on iteration and experimentation, and 
must contend with the larger market forces that exert upward pressure on per-unit 
prices, especially in the hospital sector.
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